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FDI Note: Footnote citations and text have been stripped from
this electronic copy of the 1994 State Department report on the MEK,
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1994 US State Department Report on the
People's Mojahedin of Iran
United
States Department of State Washington,
D.C 20520
Oct. 28, 1994
UNCLASSIFIED
(with SECRET attachment)
DECL: OADR
The Honorable Lee H. Hammilton,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In accordance with section 523 of
the FY 1994-95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Public Law No.
103-236, I am pleased to submit on behalf of the secretary of state the
report, "people's Mojahedin of Iran." The Administration has welcomed
the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review of the people's
Mojahedin of Iran. The U.S, Government has been monitoring the group's
activities since the 1970s. We believe the report to be a
balanced and
comprehensive analysis.
Consideration of this issue suggests
it may be appropriate to take this opportunity to restate the
Administration's policy towards the government of Iran. We want
to be
clear that our conclusions about the Mojahedin do not in any way imply
support for the behavior of the current regime in Iran. As you
are
aware, longstanding U.S policy on Iran has been based on an unvarying
premise: Iran should not enjoy the benefits of normal,
state-to-state
relation with other countries so long as it acts in ways that fall
outside generally understood patterns of acceptable government behavior.
Our record of objection to outlaw
Iranian behavior is clear. We vigorously oppose Iran's support
for
terrorism, its efforts to block the Middle East peace process through
violence, its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and its
dismal human rights record. Until Iran alters its behavior in
these
critical areas, we will continue to lead the world in pressuring
Tehran. We must convince the regime that there is a price to be
paid
for flouting international standards.We welcome the opportunity to
brief the Congress on all aspects of our bilateral relations with
Iran. You can be assured we will continue to monitor the
activities of
the Mojahedin. We remain, however, guided by the premise that our
mutual distaste for the behavior of the regime in Tehran should not
influence our analysis of the Mojahedin.
Sincerely,
Wendy R. Shermen Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
Enclosure:
Report on the People's Mojahedin of
Iran
UNCLASSIFIED
(with SECRET attachment)
DECL: OADR
PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN OF IRAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
HISTORY
CURRENT ACTIVITIES
STRUCTURE
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
INTRODUCTION
The following report has been
prepared at the request of congress. Section 525 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, public Law No.
103-256, requires the president to submit "a report detailing the
structure, current activities, external support, and history of the
people's Mojahedin of Iran . Such report shall include
information on
any current direct or indirect support by the people's Mojahedin for
acts of international terrorism." The conference report noted
that
congress intended no prejudgment of the organization and urged the
Administration to consult with a wide range of people in the
preparation of the report.
Responsibility for preparing the
report was delegated to the secretary of state by a presidential
memorandum dated July 26, 1994. Government agencies that
contributed
informational records, intelligence, analysis, and expertise to the
report include: the Departments of state, Defense (including the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the four military services), Justice,
Treasury, and Transportation: the National Intelligence Council: the
National Security Agency: and the central Intelligence Agency.
In preparing the report, we have
consulted with a large cross-section of Iranian opposition groups and
Iranian expatriates, including Mojahedin sympathizers. We
obtained the
viewpoints of prominent American academic specialists on Iran and the
Middle East through personal interviews and research of their published
works. We surveyed Iran experts at nongovernmental organizations
and
"think-tanks." We reviewed western media coverage of Mojahedin
activities. Finally, we drew upon the voluminous collection of
Mojahedin publications and radio broadcasts, a public record that
ranges from the 1960s through October 1994.
Back to Top
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The "Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e
Iran," or Organization of people's Holy Warriors of Iran, is a militant
Iranian opposition group. Its Persian name is generally shortened
to
the Mojahedin-e Khalq or the people's Mojahedin." The Mojahedin
were
established in Tehran, Iran, in 1965, by young, middle class
intellectuals. The Mojahedin revolutionaries developed and
disseminated an eclectic ideology based on their personal
interpretation of Shi'a Islamic theology and Marxist tenets. Then
as
now the Mojahedin advocated a two-pronged strategy of armed struggle
and the use of propaganda to gain their political objectives.
The Mojahedin collaborated with
Ayatollah Khomeini to overthrow the former Shah of Iran. As part
of
that struggle, they assassinated at least six American citizens,
supported the takeover of the U.S. embassy, and opposed the release of
American hostages. In the post-revolutionary political chaos,
however,
the Mojahedin lost political power to Iran's Islamic clergy. They
then
applied their dedication to armed struggle and the use of propaganda
against the new Iranian government, launching a violent and polemical
cycle of attack and reprisal. In 1981, the Mojahedin leadership
fled
to France and with other Iranian opposition movements formed the
National Council of Resistance (NCR).
Yet within a few years the NCR
became a mere shell as individuals and groups abandoned the
organization because of Mojahedin domination. In 1986, France
expelled
the leader of the Mojahedin, Masud Rajavi. Rajavi was a member of
the
Mojahedin's original "Central Committee" and "Ideological Team."
Imprisoned by the Shah's government from 1972-1979, he nonetheless
remained influential within the group. He rose to command in 1975
after the Mojahedin experienced an internal schism. From his
release
from prison until today, he has maintained absolute control of the
Mojahedin, the NCR, and its associated groups. In 1993, his wife
Maryam Rajavi replaced him as the NCR's "future president" of Iran.
Previously, she had held the appointed position of NCR
secretary-general. After his expulsion form France, Rajavi relocated to
Baghdad, Iraq, adopting Saddam Hussein as his patron, In 1987.
*Acronyms commonly used for the
group include "MKO," for Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, "MEK," for
Mojahedin-e Khalq, and "PMOL," for people's Mojahedin Organization of
Iran. The Iranian Mojahedin should not be confused with the Afghanistan
Mojahedin, the indigenous Afghan forces formed to fight the soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Rajavi announced the formation of the National
Liberation Army (NLA), the military wing of the Mojahedin, which
conducted raids into Iran during the latter years of the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq war. The NLA's last major offensive reportedly was
conducted
against Iraqi Kurds in 1991, when it joined Saddam Hussein's brutal
repression of the Kurdish rebellion. In addition to occasional
acts of
sabotage, the Mojahedin are responsible for violent attacks in Iran
that victimize civilians. They also engage in violence against
Iranian
government targets in the West.
Since their leadership's expulsion
from Iran, the Mojahedin have conducted a public relations campaign
among Western press and public officials, seeking political support and
financial backing. Exploiting Western opprobrium of the behavior
of
the current government of Iran, the Mojahedin posit themselves as the
alternative. To achieve that goal, they claim they have the
support of
a majority of Iranians. This claim is much disputed by academics and
other specialists on Iran, who assert that in fact the Mojahedin-e
Khalq have little support among Iranians. They argue that the
Mojahedin's activities since the group's leadership fled from Iran in
1981-- particularly their alliance with Iraq and the group's internal
oppression -- have discredited them among the Iranian polity. The
clerical regime in Tehran, aware of the Mojahedin's unpopularity,
attempts to discredit many of its opponents by falsely linking them to
the MKO. The Mojahedin, for their part, often dismiss their
critics as
"agents of the regime.*
Despite Mojahedin assertions that
the group has abandoned its revolutionary ideology and now favors a
liberal democracy, there is no written or public record of discussion
or debate about the dramatic reversals in the Mojahedin's stated
positions. Moreover, the Mojahedin's 29-year record of behavior
does
not substantiate its capability or intention to be democratic.
Internally, the Mojahedin run their organization autocratically,
suppressing dissent and eschewing tolerance of differing
viewpoints.
Rajavi, who heads the Mojahedin's political and military wings, has
fostered a cult of personality around himself. These characteristics
have alienated most Iranian expatriates, who assert they do not want to
replace one objectionable regime for another. Given these
attributes,
it is no coincidence that the only government in the world that
supports the Mojahedin politically and financially is the totalitarian
regime of Saddam Hussein.
Shunned by most Iranians and
fundamentally undemocratic, the Mojahedin-e Khalq are not a viable
alternative to the current government of Iran.
Back to Top
1. HISTORY
Established to overthrow the Shah,
the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization (MKO) developed an eclectic
ideological blend of Islam and Marxism that dictated both a war of
armed struggle and a war of propaganda to achieve political power.
Enthusiastic supporters of Khomeini, they were active participants in
the Iranian revolution. By 1981, however, the MKO had lost the
post-revolutionary power struggle to Iran's Shi'a Muslim clergy.
They
responded to this defeat by turning their two-pronged strategy of armed
struggle and propaganda against the Khomeini regime. This section
traces the Mojahedin's political history, from the group's
establishment in 1965 to its expulsion from parts in 1986.
ARMED STRUGGLE
As young students opposed to the
regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the founding members of the
Mojahedin rejected nonviolence reformism. Instead, they
established an
organization dedicated to armed struggle. As they explained in a
1974
newspaper article, "We had to ask ourselves the question, "What is to
be done?" Our answer was straightforward: "Armed Struggle."
1 Commitment to this strategic
principle has defined the history of the Mojahedin, from the group's
formal establishment in 1965 until today. The founders, who kept the
existence of the Mojahedin secret until 1972, organized members into
compartmentalized cells subject to the authority of a central
collective. They devoted their early years to the study and
discussion
of revolutionary theory and economics, reading such authors as Marx, Ho
Chi Minh, Che Guevara, and Frantz Fanon. They also analyzed
Islamic
history, interpreting early Shi'ism as a protest movement against class
exploitation and shi'ite oppression.
2 The Mojahedin further were
influenced by the teachings of Dr Ali Shariati, a Contemporary Iranian
academic who developed an ideology arguing that Islam, particularly
Shi'a Islam, is fundamentally revolutionary in outlook. The MKO also
claimed that the revolutions of Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam had inspired
them. Moving from theory to action, they established contact with
the
Palestine Liberation Organization, and sent members for training at
Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
The Mojahedin's initial efforts to
engage in armed struggle were ineffective. In 1972, after months of
investigation, the Shah's internal security organization, SAVAK,
arrested dozens of Mojahedin members who had unsuccessfully planned to
blow up Tehran's main electrical Power Plant. They had hoped to disrupt
the extravagant festivities the Shah sponsored in 1971 to celebrate the
anniversary of 2,500 years of the monarchy. The government organized
mass trials of the suspects, who responded by formally announcing that
they were members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, an organization which they
had formed to resolve the "fundamental contradictions between the
people and the ClA-imposed regime." The resulting executions and
imprisonments of MKO members momentarily weakened the organization, but
the survivors regrouped and restructured into an effective instrument
of political violence. Even those imprisoned were active, forming
communes, gaining recruits, and secretly coordinating with members who
had escaped arrest. The Mojahedin's future leader, Masud Rajavi,
utilized his time in Qasr prison (1972-79) to indoctrinate recruits and
establish his authority.
Outside prison, the Mojahedin
responded to the government persecution by commencing armed operations.
Bombs were the Mojahedin's weapon of choice, which they frequently
employed against American targets. On the occasion of President
Nixon's visit to Iran in 1972, for example, the MKO exploded time bombs
at more than a dozen sites throughout Tehran, including the
Iran-American Society, the U.S. information office, and the offices of
Pepsi Cola and General Motors. From 1972-75, when an internal MKO
upheaval and more regime arrests temporarily slowed down their
activities; the Mojahedin continued their campaign of bombings,
damaging such targets as the offices of Pan-American Airlines, Shell
Oil Company, and British organizations. They also attacked police posts
and prisons.
IDEOLOGY
The MKO's embrace of armed struggle
flows from the group's ideology. Its conceptual framework was
painstakingly developed through years of study and discourse and
aggressively disseminated throughout Tehran. A renowned scholar
of the
Mojahedin defines the group's ideology as: "a combination of
Muslim
themes: Shi'a notions of martyrdom: classical Marxist theories of
class struggle and historical determinism: and neo-Marxist
concepts of
armed struggle, guerrilla warfare and revolutionary heroism."8
The
adoption of Marxist tenets distinguished the Mojahedin from other
Iranian opposition movements: the Mojahedin argued that the
struggle
against the Shah was part of a larger struggle against imperialism led
by the, "world-devouring" United States.
The intellectual contradictions
between Shi'a Islam and Marxism, however, caused the Mojahedin to split
in 1975. The organization broke drown into Marxist and Muslim
factions. The Muslim faction, under Rajavi's leadership, soon
gained
control of the organization. But the religious disagreement
between
the secular and Islamic factions of the MKO did not undermine their
fundamental agreement on the issue of imperialism, nor their strategy
of armed struggle against the Pahlavi regime and American interests in
Iran. In fact, both factions continued to endorse armed
resistance,
making the Mojahedin "the single most violent underground group and the
principal killers of U.S employees in Iran."
The Mojahedin's enduring consensus
on foreign policy is demonstrated by public statements of the group's
current leader, Masud Rajavi. At his sentencing during the 1972
trials, for example, Rajavi argued that most of the world's problems
had been created by imperialism and that "the main goal now is to free
Iran of U.S. imperialism." After his release from
prison during the
political chaos of January 1979, Rajavi delivered a series of lectures
at the University of Tehran outlining the Mojahedin's program, which
remained faithful to its Marxist roots.
WAGING PROPAGANDA
Analysis of the Mojahedin's ideology
is facilitated by examination of the group's own propaganda. Like
their dedication to armed struggle, the Mojahedin's emphasis on
propaganda reflects the influence of other revolutionaries, who sought
both adherents and supporters through indoctrination, since its
inception, the group has made drafting and disseminating propaganda a
priority.
In 1968, the Mojahedin established
an "Ideological Team" charged with providing the group with its own
theoretical handbooks. In addition to these texts, the Mojahedin
published newspapers, journals, and pamphlets. They also
broadcast
clandestine radio messages from Baghdad from 1972-75. Those MKO
members imprisoned during the 1972 trials also prepared manifestos and
proclamations for outside publication. The MKO carefully
controlled
the contents of these documents, requiring permission from the Central
Committee before one could be issued under the Mojahedin
name. After
the 1979 revolution, under Rajavi's leadership, the MKO reorganized and
launched a weekly newspaper, Mojahed. In February 1979-, the
group
issued a detailed fourteen-point program titled, "Our Minimal
Expectations." Among other actions, it recommended that Iran
cancel
all agreements with "racist" state of Israel.
"DEATH TO AMERICA"
MKO Assassinations
In the period leading up to the
revolution and its immediate aftermath, the Mojahedin carried out their
strategy of armed struggle. The results included the murder of
Americans, support for the seizure of the U.S. embassy, and opposition
to the release of U.S. hostages. The Mojahedin are known to have
assassinated the following Americans in Iran during the 1970s:
Lt. Colonel Lewis L. Hawkins
Killed: June 2, 1973
Air Force Colonel Paul Schaeffer
Killed: May 21, 1975
Air Force Lt. Colonel Jack
Turner Killed: May 21, 1975
Donald G. Smith, Rockwell
International Killed: August 28, 1976
Robert R. Krongrad, Rockwell
International Killed: August 28, 1976
William C. Cottrell, Rockwell
International Killed: August 28, 1976
Reza Reza'i, a member of the
Mojahedin's Ideological Team, was arrested and executed by the Shah's
government for the murder of Colonel Hawkins. The attacks on the
Rockwell employees occurred on the anniversary of the arrest of a
Mojahedin member, Rahman vahid Afrakhteh, for the murder of Colonels
Schaeffer and Turner. In addition. Air Force Brigadier General
Harold
price was wounded in a 1972 attack Planned by Mojahedin Central
committee member, Kazem Zul Ai-Anvar. Widely credited in Tehran
for
these attacks at the time, the Mojahedin themselves claimed
responsibility for these murders in their publications.
Collaboration with Khomeini
Throughout 1977-79, the Shah, under
international pressure, released political prisoners, including members
of the Mojahedin. They played a significant part in the strikes and
demonstrations that characterized that period. Like most anti-Shah
elements, the Mojahedin fully supported Khomeini. When the Shah's army
disintegrated in February 1979, the Mojahedin's guerrilla organizations
played a critical role in fighting the remnants of the pahlavi regime,
appropriating government weapons in. the process. Some observers claim
the Mojahedin assisted in the identification, arrest, and execution of
alleged supporters of the Shah's regime. Thousands of these
individuals, presumed to be opponents of the new Khomeini government,
were sentenced to death by Ayatollah Khalkhali, the head of the
Revolutionary Tribunal also Known as the "hanging judge."15
Mojahedin Support for Hostage-Taking
Under Rajavi's leadership, the
Mojahedin entered the political fray in 1979, working to expand the
group's membership and popularity. Mojahedin newspapers and
proclamations published at the time confirm the group's leadership in
renouncing the United States. The very day that 400 university
students overtook the U.S. embassy, the Mojahedin issued a proclamation
headlined, "After the Shah, it's America's turn."16 Following the
seizure of the embassy, the Mojahedin participated physically at the
site, assisting in holding and defending the embassy against
liberation. They also offered political support for the
hostage-Keeping. For example, the Mojahedin sent a telegram to
Khomeini expressing allegiance to the Ayatollah's policy of "rooting
out the aggressive, American imperialism of the traitorous Shah."
The
telegram closed with the following declaration: "(We are)
awaiting the
definitive command of the Imam (Khomeini) for uprooting all the
imperialist and Zionist foundations.
The Mojahedin responded to the
failed hostage rescue attempt by announcing in Mojahed that they had
placed their "military units," "part-time guerrilla units" and
"militia" at the disposal of the Revolutionary Guards to fight U.S.
imperialism.18 After 444 days of captivity, the hostages were released
in January 1991. The next issue of Mojahed reminded readers that
"the
Mojahedin-e Khalq were the first force who rose unequivocally to the
support of the occupation of the American spy center," and further
noted that Mojahedin members spent "days and weeks," "in neat and
cold," in front of the embassy in an effort to ensure that the occupied
embassy was "an active and zealous anti-imperialist center." It
described the release of the nostages as a "retreat" and "surrender"
and warned that resumption of diplomatic relations with the United
States would be "treason to the people and to the blood of our
martyrs."19
SWITCHING SIDES
By 1981, the opposition groups which
had formed the base of the popular uprising against the Shah had lost
the post-revolutionary power struggle to Khomeini and his new
regime.
The anti-clerical Islamic theology espoused by the Mojahedin ensured
the group's disenfranchisement. Like dismissed president Abol
Hassan
Bani Sadr, they had failed in secure a position in the new political
structure. Although Rajavi and Bani Sadr fled to parts in July
1981,
the Mojahedin resumed their strategy of armed struggle
internally.
Only the target had changed. Against Khomeini, whom the Mojahedin
had
supported for more than 15 years, they now declared war.
The Mojahedin initiated a wave of
bombings and assassinations against the Khomeini regime that
reverberates today. The most spectacular attack occurred June 28,
1981, when two bombs ripped apart the headquarters of the Islamic
Republic party (IRP, the party of the clerics), killing 74 members of
the regime's top leadership, including the IRP's leader, Ayatollah
Beheshti, 14 ministers, and 27 Majles deputies. On August 30, the
Mojahedin reportedly bombed a meeting of the regime's National Security
Council, Killing the new president, Alt Raja'i, and his new prime
Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar. In September, the Mojahedin
engaged
in direct military clashes with the government's forces but were
defeated. Throughout the next few years, the Mojahedin assassinated
Majlis candidates and members, clerics, judges, and others they
identified as foes. The group also detonated bombs in Tehran and
throughout the country.2" The swath of terror cut by the MKO was
matched by an equally ruthless response from the Khomeini regime, many
of whose current leaders -- including Rafsanjani and Khamene'i -- were
injured in these attacks.
The regime hunted down and
indiscriminately executed thousands of purported Mojahedin supporters.
During this period the Mojahedin and the Khomeini regime also
established what was to become a defining characteristic of their cycle
of violent attacks and reprisals. The Mojahedin selectively
claimed
credit for terrorist acts, identifying only with those incidents whose
outcome they determined would enhance their image, the government, on
the other hand, named the MKO for every act of violence. While
the
record has been obscured by hyperbole, it is important to remember that
--particularly during the early 1980's -- the Mojahedin maintained both
the willingness and the capability to carry out their violent
objectives.2' Moreover, since 1981 the MKO themselves have
claimed
responsibility for murdering thousands of Iranians they describe as"
agents of the regime."22
RISE AND FALL:
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE
Arriving in Paris in 1981, the
Mojahedin and Bani Sadr established the National Council of Resistance
(NCR). Exhilarated by the apparent weakness of the Khomeini regime,
which was struggling with the internal instability generated by
Mojahedin terrorism and the external threat posed by Iraq's 1980
invasion, the NCR initially included many elements of the Iranian
opposition. Groups such as the Kurdish Democratic party of Iran,
the
National Democratic Front, the Hoviyat Group (an offshoot of a militant
leftist group, the Fedayeen), the Union of Iranian Communists, the
Workers' Party, the Union for Workers' Liberation, the United Left
Council for Democracy and Independence, and other leftist organizations
joined the NCR.
In an early demonstration if its
intolerance for dissent, the Mojahedin refused to allow the
participation of the Liberation Movement (also known as the Freedom
Party), a prominent liberal opposition group- The Mojahedin
also
refused the membership of the Fedayeen and Tudeh (Communist)
party.
Other resistance groups were wary of the Mojahedin's brand of
revolutionary Islam. The National Front (Mossadeq's nationalist
party
) refused to join the Council because it objected to the concept of
Islamic government. Two other Marxist organizations, which
similarly
objected to the religious aspect of the Mojahedin's ideology, also
refused to join.
Additionally, the NCR boasted the
support of organizations already controlled by the Mojahedin, including
the Muslim Student Association, the Tawhidi Society of Guilds, the
Movement of Muslim Teachers, the Union of Instructors in Universities
and Institutions of Higher Learning, and the„. Society for the Defense
of Democracy and Independence in Iran. The early promise of the NCR as
an effective resistance front soon receded, however. Defying the
initial expectations of most observers, the Khomeini regime regained
control and expanded its power, In Paris; the non-Mojahedin members of
the NCR encountered the autocratic style of Rajavi. In
particular,
Rajavi's unilateral decision to tie the Council to Iraq alienated the
others, who viewed the alliance as a traitor's deed. The
Council's
most important participant, former president Bani Sadr, formally split
in 1984, castigating Rajavi as "a pawning the settlement of the
Iran-Iraq conflict." (Bani Sadr asserts that the first formal
pact
between the Mojahedin and Iraq was negotiated during a January 1983
meeting between Rajavi and Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz in Fragce.
Mojahedin publications also confirm this meeting.)
RED CARPET IN BAGHDAD
In June 1986, France forced Rajavi
to leave the country in what the media speculated was a deal with the
government of Iran. According to these reports, Rajavi's
departure was
the price France Paio for the release of French hostages in
Lebanon.
The MKO portrayed the, ouster as Rajavi's "historic flight for peace
and freedom." Rajavi's former attorneys, an Iranian
jurist then
resident in France, explained the move:
"When Rajavi came to France, he and
his supporters quickly ran out of money. The Iraqi government offered
him support and they accepted. In the long run, they became
proxies of
the Iraqi regime and lost much of their credibility within
Iran."
Military scholar Anthony Cordesman offered another analysis: "The
end
result of trance's action, however, was to give Rajavi much better
access to arms, training facilities near the border, and much larger
financial resources."28
According to press reports, more
than 1,000 Mojahedin members joined Rajavi in his relocation to
Baghdad, where in a mocking gesture to the government of Iran, the
Iraqis marked his arrival by hosting the type of ceremony normally
accorded to a visiting government leader. The
Mojahedin's dedication
to armed struggle had turned a new corner.
Back to Top
II. CURRENT ACTIVITIES
Evidence of the Mojahedin's dual
strategy of armed struggle and propaganda is visible not only in the
group's publications and history but in its recent performance, as
well. The following section traces Mojahedin operations in these
two
areas since the Mojahedin's flight from Iran in 1981 through its
activities today. The group's most significant act during this
time
period was its 1986 relocation to Baghdad.
PERSIANS AMONG ARABS
After Rajavi relocated to Baghdad in
June 1986, he drew upon Iraq's assistance to create the National l-be
rationing Army (NLA), which was formally established in
1987.
Subsequent reports indicated that Baghdad "Provided training facilities
and staging grounds for the (NLA) unit's operations, as well as
headquarters facilities in the Iraqi capital." One Western reporter
trekked to Baghdad in 1988 to gauge the progress of the Mojahedin since
their expulsion from France. He noted the Mojahedin's "softened
ideology and assertions of battlefield prowess," and described their
two-part strategy for gaining power. "The first (element), a military
campaign, is supposed to establish the credibility of the Mojahedin, or
Warriors of God. Another element ... is a political and
propaganda
drive designed to revise its anti-American history and to blur its
near-total dependence on cooperation with Baghdad. Iran's enemy
and
the base of its military operations."
To conduct a military campaign whose
threat to Iran has been derisively compared to a "mosquito," the
Mojahedin developed a lopsided alliance with Iraq's Saddam Hussein.
Dependent upon Saddam for money, arms, bases (approximately five), and
permission to strike, the Mojahedin's "National Liberation Army" became
a tool in Iraq's conflict with Iran. in 1984 and 1987, for example, the
Iraqi government cast ceasefire proposals as a response to the requests
of the "peace-loving" Rajavi. This exercise in public
diplomacy was
designed to undercut the Iranian government's internal support.
The
Mojahedin's actual military efforts have consisted of occasional
strikes against border towns, industrial targets (particularly oil
installations), and civilian targets.
BROTHERS IN ARMS
At the border the Mojahedin's
military record is limited. The group launched its most
significant
incursion in June and July 1988, when they coordinated an advance into
Iran with Iraqi forces. During the same offensive, Iraqi units in other
sectors of the front used chemical weapons against Iran. NLA
units
briefly seized the Iranian border towns of Mehran, Karand, and
Islamabad-e Gharb. The Mojahedin claimed to have killed 40,000
Iranians, but other military observers said the, NLA "just got wiped
out" when Iranian reinforcements arrived. The
U.N-brokered ceasefire
between Iran and Iraq, which went into effect August 20, 1988, undercut
the Mojahedin's utility to Saddam. But the Mojahedin remained in
Iraq. "Mojahedin have learned to take proper tactics hen
and if
necessary," one MKO spokesman said when questioned about the group's
future in Iraq after the war. "We have always adjusted tactics in
our
fighting. The form of fighting is secondary."
In March 1991, following Operation
Desert Storm, the NLA reportedly fought against the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards near the border town of Qasr-e Shirin. Analysts
assume that Saddam permitted the NLA to cross into Iran at this time in
order to signal that he would not tolerate Iranian support for a Shi'a
uprising in southern Iraq. At that tine, the Iraqi
Kurds also
claimed the Mojahedin had assisted the Iraqi army in its suppression of
the Kurds, "a claim-substantiated by refugees who fled near the Iranian
border." The leader of the patriotic Union of
Kurdistan of Iraq,
Jalal Talabani, told reporters that "5,000 Iranian Mojahedin joined
Saddam's forces in the battle for Kirkuk."
A recent Wall Street Journal report
stated that the NLA's "only major offensive in the past six years came
in 1991, just after the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein ordered Mr.
Rajavi to help quell a Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq, participants in
that operation say." A former MKO member who was in
Iraq said his
trouble with the Mojahedin leadership, began when he questioned the
MKO's operation against the Kurds.
In April 1992, Iran bombed the MKO's
primary base, Ashraf, located some 40 miles north of Baghdad and 30
miles west of the border --territory which remained under Saddam's
control. Military analysts said the Iranian attack confirmed the "phony
alliance" incorrectly assumed to have developed after operation Desert
Storm.
Domestic Attacks
In publications distributed in the
West, the Mojahedin claim they do not target civilians in Iran.
We are
unable to confirm or refute this assertion. We do know, however,
that
in radio broadcasts of the "Voice of Mojahed," which are transmitted
into Iran from Mojahedin bases in Iraq, the MKO has claimed
responsibility for internal violence throughout Iran. On August 20,
1992, for example, "Voice of Mojahed" reported, "supporters of the
Mojahedin-e Khalq in Kudasht (city), Lorestan (province), threw a
grenade at the home of the regimes so called Majlis deputy here and
damaged it.... The grenade was thrown at one side of the house to
warn
him about his crimes. At an opportune time, he will be punished
for
them."
On October 12, 1992, the Mojahedin
claimed credit for bomb explosions (two out of three planted went off)
at Khomeini's tomb, a site 10 miles south of Tehran visited daily by
thousands of Iranians. Then, on October 26, 1992,
"Voice of Mojahed"
claimed credit for blowing up a local Revolutionary Guard outpost in
the town of Qasr-e Firuzeh. The broadcast further reported the
exhortations of Maryam Rajavi, "While the enemy was reeling from the
blow dealt a few days ago --the bomb explosion at Khomeini's tomb --he
received another fiery and painful blow." It continued, "such sparks
herald a massive volcanic eruption by the National Liberation Army,
which will obliterate all vestiges of Khomeini's clerics and the Guards
of his regime from this country –a volcanic, erupt ion which is being
prepared today by the (Mojahedin)." In a later
broadcast that same
day, the Mojahedin reported blowing up a gasoline station in Qom on
October 15.
In June 1995, the Mojahedin claimed
responsibility for bombing oil refineries and other sites in southern
and Western Iran. The sabotage they described included "bombs and
mines and booby-traps" which targeted a number of MKO-determined "enemy
agents," including a "tyrant" whose residence was "attacked and
destroyed." "Voice of Mojahed" lauded the "tyranny-destroying
conflagration of the National Liberation Army." "Voice of
Mojahed"
reported another "extensive series of operations" on March 18.
1994.
It cited "epic-making attacks" with mortars, mines, booby-traps, bombs,
and fire.
A number of these self-described
operations included attacks against clearly civilian targets, such as
automobiles, highways, government buildings open to the public,
businesses. and private homes. As a March 1994 broadcast
claimed:
"The exploding of bombs ... took place on the various streets and
districts (throughout Iran)."
LOYAL TO SADDAM
The Mojahedin have been able to
undertake these raids and to support limited internal disruption
because of their close Collaboration with Saddam. Visitors to
Mojahedin bases in Iraq have identified their cache of weapons as
Iraqi-donated arms, many of which were originally purchased from the
Soviet Union, In a 1993 trip to a Mojahedin base in Iraq, one reporter
saw "about 35 ageing tanks, armored personnel carriers, Chinese-made
field guns and Russian multiple-rocket launchers." In
May 1988, the
New York Times described the Mojahedin forces as "basically a
light-infantry unit, equipped with Soviet-made armored personnel
carriers and artillery. It is also said to follow Soviet-style
tactics
and procedures, which parallel those of the Iraqi Army."
During Iraq's summer 1988 campaign
into Iran, the Iraqis reportedly turned over to the Mojahedin "large
hauls of small munitions, mobile artillery, shells, tanks and other
weapons" captured by the Iraqi forces. Another
reporter, visiting
the Mojahedin in August 1994, noted, however, that "the weapons
deployed (were) mainly of Russia, manufacture," indicating they likely
came from Iraqi stocks. While the NLA claims to have
captured all of
its equipment from Iran, its limited military endeavors could not have
yielded any significant amounts of weaponry.
In return for weapons and the use of
approximately 232 square miles of Iraqi territory, the
Mojahedin
provide Iraq with political support. Disregarding the casualties
inflicted upon Iran after Saddam's 1980 invasion and overlooking his
1990 assault of Kuwait, the Mojahedin remain staunch supporters of
Saddam Hussein. As one Italian reporter who visited MKO bases in
August 1994 explained, "Support for the Iranian resistance is important
to Saddam Hussein ... because the Mojahedin conduct diplomatic activity
in favor of the abolition of the embargo against
Iraq..."
Government-controlled Iraqi media accounts of recent Saddam-Rajavi
contacts provide further insights into the MKO's current relationship
with Baghdad. Meeting between the two are announced to buttress
Saddam's isolated position or to send a message to the government of
Iran. For example:
o On July 31, 1994,,.
Rajavi sent Saddam a "message of congratulations."
o On January 26, 1994,
Rajavi met with-Saddam and Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister.
o On July 18, 1993,
Rajavi sent "cable of congratulations" to Saddam.
o On June 17,1992,
Rajavi and a
Mojahedin delegation visited Saddam. In his statement, Rajavi
said,
"Iranian national movements and their masses strongly denounce the
Iranian regime's alliance with U.S imperialism, world Zionism, and
regional reactionaries to launch aggression against Iraq, participate
in the blockade on it, and interfere in the domestic affairs of this
safe, steadfast country in the interests of colonial schemes and
conspiracies." A day later, "Voice of Mojahed" reported the
visit,
noting that "the meeting between Rajavi and Hussein has been widely
reported by international news agencies,"
o On August 5, 1991,
just one year
after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Rajavi met with Iraq's vice chairman of the
Revolution Command Council, "Izzat Ibrabim, and Iraq's Interior
Minister, Alt Hasan al-Majid. The next day, Rajavi
met with Iraq's
Culture and Information Minister, Yusuf Mammadi. These public meetings
were undoubtedly an Iraqi signal to Iran that Baghdad would not
tolerate Tehran's support of the Shia'a uprising in southern Iraq.
ATTACKS IN THE WEST
While the Mojahedin's activities in
the West since their expulsion from Iran have been focused primarily on
the dissemination of propaganda and the lobbying of Western officials,
they occasionally carry out violent attacks against Iranian government
targets located in the West. The most spectacular incidents took place
April 5, 1992, when in a wave of coordinated attacks members of the
Mojahedin stormed Iranian diplomatic missions in New York City, Canada,
Germany, France, Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway, and Australia. "In New York, "according to press
reports, "five men armed with knives invaded the Iranian Mission to the
United Nations, took three hostages, smashed furniture and computers
and spray-painted slogans on walls in a two-hour rampage behind chained
doors.... In Ottawa, Iran's Embassy was attacked and pillaged by about
55 people armed with sticks and hammers. And in Europe, hundreds
of
Iranian dissidents stormed Tehran's embassies and consulates ... and
many of the Iranian missions were extensively damaged, some by
firebombs."
The MKO acknowledged on "Voice of
Mojahed" that they had "ransacked or set on fire" the diplomatic
missions, and stated that the violence was a response to Iran's air
attack on their base in Iraq the day before. The
similarities in the
modus operandi and the rapidity with which the attacks occurred
suggests a centrally planned action that was conceived and coordinated
far in advance of Tehran's air raid.
On July 16,1992, "Voice of Mojahed"
reported an MKO attack on an automobile carrying-Iranian Foreign
Minister Velayati, who was visiting Potsdam. Similar confrontations
have occurred in other European countries since 1991, including France,
Italy, and Switzerland. In December 1995, the Mojahedin stated
they
mistook two Turkish officials in Baghdad for Iranian diplomats and shot
them dead.66
The Mojahedin also have been victims
of Iranian government terrorism. For example, in 1990 Rajavi's
brother, Kazem Rajavi was assassinated in Geneva.
Three years later, the Iranian
government assassinated the head of the Mojahedin's office in
Rome:
on March 16, 1993, Mohammad Hussein Naqdi was shot by two men on a
motor scooter who pulled up to his car while it was stopped in Rome's
rush-hour traffic. The attack was described "as another episode
in the
underground war between Iran's Islamic leaders and their
foes." The
regime's agents also have attacked MKO members in Turkey and Pakistan.
A more recent example of MKO armed
activity in the West involved a Danish police raid on a Copenhagen
villa used by the Mojahedin. The police arrested four Iranians
and
charged three with violating weapons laws. According to the
September
4, 1994, issue of the Danish daily newspaper Berlingske Tidende, the
Danish police suspect that the villa-has been the center for
international terrorist activities."
CAMPAIGN OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
Seeking Support
After the flight of the Mojahedin
leadership from Iran in 1981, the group internationalized its
propaganda to gain new adherents and attract Western supporters.
From
his new post as chairman of the National Council of Resistance (NCR), a
position he assumed in 1986 and still holds today, Rajavi commenced a
campaign of public relations that developed into the formidable
Mojahedin outreach program currently operating. Use of the media is key
to this program. The Mojahedin issue numerous publications,
including
press releases, news bulletins, reports, brochures, books, and open
letters (typically from Rajavi to the U.N. Secretary General or to
Western leaders). Rajavi and his wife Maryam Rajavi (who since
their
marriage has held various high-level, appointed positions in Mojahedin
organizations) regularly provide interviews to the press. The NCR
also
solicits the support of prominent public figures, and practices a
determined lobbying effort among Western parliamentarians.
Despite
these efforts, the Mojahedin in fact are supported by only one
government in the world --Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
To conduct its propaganda campaign,
the group has established offices throughout Western Europe, the United
States, Canada, Australia and the Middle East. These offices are
responsible for coordinating the public relations effort and through
their activities have established the Mojahedin as the best organized
Iranian opposition group. They sponsor public demonstrations and
marches. Other types of publicity measures include television
programming and musical concerts that feature prominent Iranian
musicians. The Mojahedin claim the audiences for these
performances
are indicative of MKO support.
As required by the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, the Mojahedin must register a record of their public
activities in the United States with the Department of Justice.
With
each registration, they submit copies of their press releases, as well
as lists of editorial placements, speeches, and broadcast interviews to
the Justice Department. The organization also transmits
unsolicited
faxes and mail of its publications to various U.S. government offices,
including the State Department, on a regular basis.
The Mojahedin focus their public
relations efforts on the objectionable activities of the Iranian
government. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), for example,
the
Mojahedin stressed the horrors of the conflict and highlighted
Khomeini's intransigence in negotiating peace. The Mojahedin
publication, "Khomeini: The Enemy of peace and Freedom," is one
sample
of such materials.
The contents include a section on
the "diplomatic activities" of the Mojahedin to end the war and maps of
the Mojahedin's "resistance" activity in Iran. After the war, the
Mojahedin stepped up its campaign to publicize the Iranian regime's
dismal record on human rights, issuing, for example, "A Report on 64
forms of torture practiced by the Khomeini regime." Another
common
practice of the group is to collect statements issued by prominent
individuals. Western governments, the E.U and the U.N condemning
Iranian government abuses and to reissue them as a package under the
Mojahedin name -- although the Mojahedin are not a factor in the
Western condemnations. Likewise, the Mojahedin collect Western press
reports that describe objectionable behavior by the Iranian government
and re-publish them in Mojahedin documents.
Mojahedin publications tend to
mirror concurrent Western public diplomacy. For example, recent
Mojahedin press releases have condemned Khomeini's fatwa against Salman
Rushdie. The Mojahedin have also responded to Western concerns
about
Iran's regional foreign policy, highlighting Iran's program of
rearmament and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. One
Mojahedin
official explained the group's strategy to an Arab interviewer:
"At
political and international levels, the (Mojahedin) organization stress
(as) to the region and the world that the main threat to the entire
Gulf region (is) the Tehran expansionist regime."
Through such
efforts, the Mojahedin attempt to transform Western opprobrium For the
government of Iran into expressions of support for themselves.
As a result of their public
relations campaign, the Mojahedin are also "well-known to Western
journalists and 'officials for their single-minded
lobbying. Or as
another American journalist opined, "By keeping on good terms with
enough journalists, they hope to transform their public image in
America from terrorists to Freedom fighters."72 Yet
because the
Mojahedin are partisan, most academics and specialists on Iran have
concluded that the majority of their propaganda is too selective and
politicized to be a reliable source of information on Iran. After
visiting Iran, & U.N. Special Representative on human rights, Dr.
Reynaldo Galindo-poll, likewise found some Mojahedin allegations
inaccurate.
Recasting the Mojahedin Agenda
The major objective of the MKO's
public relations campaign is to posit the Mojahedin as the alternative
to the current Iranian government, or in their words, the "face of Iran
to be," and in so doing gain both new adherents and Western political
and financial support. To achieve these objectives, they must
ensure
their organization and its espoused principles appeal to Western
audiences and Iranian
expatriates.
This task requires that the Mojahedin renounce their anti-Western
history and emphasize Western themes. The first expression of Mojahedin
ideology aimed at attracting Western support was published in "1981,
when Bani Sadr and Rajavi issued a "Covenant" for the National Council
of Resistance. Also known as the proposed platform of the
"provisional
Government of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran," the covenant
was prepared by Bani Sadr, who still retained the title of president of
Iran, and Rajavi, as chairman of the NCR and future president of a
provisional government. Under the proposed scenario, Rajavi and
the
NCR were to govern Iran until a new constitution could be drafted.
Similar in many respects to the Minimum Expectations Program the
Mojahedin had outlined in Iran in 1979, the Covenant promised
simultaneously to establish a democracy and to declare Islam as the
national religion. It further promised respect for civil
liberties--
except for persons identified with either the Shah's or Khomeini's
regimes. The document claimed that the new government would
uproot
imperialism and nationalize foreign trade. Current Mojahedin
publications assert the group's advocacy of specific guidelines for a
future provisional government, including: "democracy," "peace,"
"love,
friendship, and unity," "separation of church and state," and
"recognition of private ownership and a market economy," A recent
addition has been the Mojahedin claim to support the Middle East peace
process. The group also stresses its commitment to the rights of
women
and has drafted a "NCR plan on Women's Rights."
These claims present a revolutionary
departure from the substantial written record of Mojahedin
ideology.
Examples of such reversals include the switch from revolutionary Islam
to separation of church and state and from nationalization to private
ownership. Yet the changes in MKO ideology occurred without any
public
debate, and there is no public record of discussion or review of
Mojahedin principles. It is also unclear when each change in
policy
occurred, and what internal factors motivated each shift. The
absence
of dialogue about this critical issue of ideology contrasts markedly
with the group's earlier history of discourse.
Nor are these new claims
substantiated by the record of the Mojahedin's activities throughout
the last 29 years. Mojahedin organizations do not follow the
principles outlined in their revised propaganda. In particular,
the
Mojahedin have never practiced democracy within their own organization,
the Mojahedin-dominated NCR, or the NLA. The early Mojahedin was
run
by an appointed Central Committee. Rajavi and his appointees have
ruled the Mojahedin since 1979 and the NCR since its establishment in
1981. Many Iranians who have dealt with MKO members assert that
the
Mojahedin suppress dissent, often with force, and do not tolerate
different viewpoints. The Mojahedin's credibility is also undermined by
the fact that they deny or distort sections of their history, such as
the use of violence or opposition to Zionism. It is difficult to
accept at face value promises of future conduct when an organization
fails to acknowledge its past.
The Mojahedin's own publications
further suggest the insincerity of their ideological alteration.
In
past two years, the Mojahedin have begun to appropriate Iranian
national symbols for use in their publications. One
recently-issued
journal is named "The Lion and the Sun" in reference to two symbols
used by the monarchy throughout Iranian history. Yet the
Mojahedin
worked to overthrow the Shah's monarchy and today refuse to work with
monarchist oppositionists, who likewise bitterly oppose the MKO.
Similarly, the Mojahedin have abandoned their original flag, whose
symbols include a Quranic verse, sickle, and Kalashnikov, in favor of
the royal flag used during the Sah's rule.
The Mojahedin have also begun
incorporating the "Mossadeq" name into their publications. "The Lion
and Sun" journal, for example, contains report on "The Rising that
Restored Mossadeq." In fact, the Mojahedin rejects the
nonviolent,
constitutional opposition exemplified by Mossadeq. The political
party
that was the heir to Mossadeq's policies, the National Front, refused
in 1981 to work with the NCR because of the Mojahedin's revolutionary
Islamic ideology. These cosmetic modifications appear to be aimed
at
expatriate Iranian audiences, among whom these symbols would resonate.
Back to Top
III. STRUCTURE
The internal organizational
structure of the Mojahedin has varied little throughout the group's
history. Importantly, the autocratic decision-making style of the
leadership and the cult-like behavior of its members -- two defining
patterns of the organization's operations -- have combined to deny the
Mojahedin the support of most Iranians, who fear that a "Mojahedin"
alternative would be as bad ad or worse than the current clerical
regime.
THREE IN ONE: MKO/NCR/NLA
The MKO's penchant for aliases has
created some confusion. The group's original Persian name, the
Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, has been shortened and translated
into several commonly-used monikers: the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the
Mojahedin, the MKO, the M k, the people's Mojahedin of Iran, and the
PMOI. Currently, the group favors the "PMOI" appellation.
The Mojahedin's deliberate use of
the name of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR) also is
misleading. Once a bona fide coalition, the Council disintegrated
in
the 1980s, when many of the resistance groups that had joined in 1981
left the organization because of their objections to Rajavi's
dictatorial methods and his unilateral decision to ally with
Iraq.
The most devastating ruptures occurred in 1984, when former president
Bani Sadr withdrew from the Council, and again in1985, when the Kurdish
Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-T) withdrew its membership (the Kurdish
organization formally ratified its decision in1986). These two
withdrawals, and their motivating factors, prompted a mass exodus and
discouraged new membership. Other opposition groups which never
became
part of the NCR and with whom the NCR refuses to associate with
include: the monarchists, notably the Iranian Constitutionalists and
the Flag of Freedom Organization of Iran: and the main factions of the
People's Fedayeen Guerrillas. The National Democratic Front, a leftist
group that formed after the revolution, has remained a part of the
Council, however. The "Revolutionary Leadership," a splinter
group of
the KDP-I, also has become a member.
Rajavi's authoritarian style
rendered the NCR incapable of becoming a truly democratic and
representative council. Bani Sadr's version of their "difficult
coexistence" in France, for example, is that Rajavi wanted "total
control." Other members of the council also realized that the Mojahedin
did in fact have full control. "The Mojahedin determined who
could
join ... who was worthy of being given ... voting rights .... Critics
were either squeezed out of the National Council or
silenced." In
1994, the KDP-I explained the rationale behind its early abandonment of
the NCR: "In view of our working experience with the Mojahedin
between
1981 to 1986 and of their attitude towards the Iranian democratic
opposition since then, we consider the Mojahedin an anti-democratic and
sectarian organization who can not be trusted to be faithful to
democratic aspirations of the Iranian people."(Sic)
Rajavi's authoritarianism has its
roots in the Mojahedin's organizational history in Iran. His firm
control of the Mojahedin, de facto bY 1975, was institutionally
established in 1979, when upon his release from prison he hand-picked a
new leadership from among his prison colleagues. Reviving the
group's
original structure, he reorganized the Mojahedin into compartmentalized
cells of activity that responded to his orders or those of his
appointees. In 1986, for example, after he had relocated to Iraq,
Rajavi unilaterally dissolved the PMOI's Central Committee and
personally appointed a 500-person Central Council. Today his fiat
appears to be similarly unchecked.
The NCR now claims it includes 229
political dignitaries, most of whom are also members of the Mojahedin
or the National Liberation Army, and six organizations, for a total of
255 members. From these members, it has appointed eight
committees
which it states will serve as the basis of future government
ministries. Many of these member groups are actually shell
organizations, established by the Mojahedin in order to make the NCR
appear representative and the Mojahedin popular. Likewise, the NCR has
formed associated groups with benign names, such as the "Association of
Iranian Scholars and Professionals" and the "Association of Iranian
Women." They have even usurped the names of unaffiliated, professional
associations to promote their cause. In California, for example,
the
Mojahedin applied for a demonstration permit using the name of "The
Society of Iranian Professionals." Alerted by the California
state
government, the Society issued a public letter which reads in part,
"People of Mojahedin are using our name without our permit to promote
their political activities. The Society of Iranian Professionals does
not have any direct or indirect relationship to "Mojahedin." (Sic)
Although the NCR claims that it is a
democratic organization, its practices do not sustain the
rhetoric.
For example, it is unclear what criteria are applied to evaluate
whether or not a group or individual is eligible to become a
member.
Nor is it clear what standards are used to distinguish between group
and individual memberships -- both of which have equal voting
rights.
For a number of years in the 1980s, the Mojahedin described the council
as a body of 12 organizations and representatives. Then, in 1986,
Mojahedin publications claimed the NCR was a coalition of 15 political
parties and personalities. In 1992, the NCR announced it had
again
expanded its membership from 21 to 150. In 1993, the NCR expanded
to
its current total of 255. This expansion to 255 members occurred
just
before the group replaced Masud Rajavi as the "future president of
Iran" with his third wife, Maryam. Because the NCR membership appears
to be chosen by NCR chairman Rajavi, it is a questionable source of
political legitimacy.
The objective of these expansions
appears to be an effort to bolster the NCR's claim that it "embraces
all the political forces struggling against the terrorist-religious
dictatorship ruling Iran and representing the unanimous majority of the
various strata of people in the country.
Scholars and specialists
knowledgeable about Iranian affairs, however, reject this claim as
false. Among most experts -- whose work responsibilities require
travel to Iran, discussions with Iranian expatriates, and acquaintance
with the Mojahedin --there exists a singular consensus that the
Mojahedin have negligible support among Iranians.
The third entity in the Mojahedin
constellation is the National Liberation Army (NLA). Also a
creation
of Rajavi, the NLA was established by him in 1987 with assistance from
Saddam Hussein. In addition to his leadership of the Mojahedin
and
chairmanship of the NCR, Rajavi moreover is the "Commander-in-Chief" of
the NLA. His wife, Maryam Rajavi, now styled as the "future
president
of Iran," was previously deputy commander-in-chief of the NLA and
secretary-general of the Mojahedin.
We could not find reliable estimates
of the numbers of Mojahedin and NCR members or sympathizers in the
United States, specifically, or worldwide. There are reports that
a
few thousand members reside at NLA bases in Iraq, but those estimates
are unconfirmed.
CULT OF OPPOSITION.
Masud Rajavi complements his
authoritarian leadership by fostering a personality cult that revolves
primarily around himself and secondarily around his wife,
Maryam. In
1988, Professor Ervand Abrahamian analyzed the factors underlying this
situation:
By mid-1987, the Mojahedin
organization had all the main attributes of a cult. It had its
own
revered leader whom it referred to formally as the "Guide" and
informally as the "present Imam." The Mojahedin had created a
rigid
hierarchy in which instructions flowed From above and the primary
responsibility of the rank-and-file was to obey without asking too many
questions. It had produced its own handbooks, censorship index,
world
outlook, historical interpretations and, of course, distinct ideology
-- an ideology which, despite the organization's denials, tried to
synthesize the religious message of Shi'ism with the social science of
Marxism... It had its own history, martyrs, hagiographies,
honored
families.... The organization had adopted its own dress code and
physical appearance.... It had set up in Iraq its own communes,
printing presses, offices, militias, training camps, barracks, clinics,
schools, and even prisons, known as "re-education centers."
The Mojahedin themselves have
described the repressive conditions of the NLA bases in Iraq. A former
member of the MKO, Hadi Shams-Haeri, who broke away from the
organization in 1991 after 15 years of membership, wrote an insider's
account of the group's activities which was published in 1995 as a
two-part series in the Persian language section of the Iran Times
newspaper. Shams-Haeri said, for example, that members who tried
to
leave were jailed, held either in an NLA camp of placed in an Iraqi
prison. Moreover, they were condemned to execution for their
dissent,
but the orders are stayed until the MKO "reaches victory" in
Iran.
Shams-Haeri said that members were considered members "for life."
He
said they were only allowed to read Mojahedin publications and that
they were monitored by informers. He also said the Mojahedin
forced
couples and families to separate, arguing that the people?, should
devote their love only to Masud and Maryam Rajavi.
Those who monitor Mojahedin
activities have also found evidence of controlled behavior. A
Wall
Street Journal reporter interviewed former members of the MKO this
summer who described an authoritarian environment. These
individuals,
who refused to give their names for fear of retribution, claimed that
the Mojahedin jailed or beat dissidents at MKO basses in Iraq.
They
also said that the Mojahedin forced couples living at MKO bases in Iraq
to divorce, and, sent their children to live in MKO member homes in
Europe. The NLA reportedly prohibits physical contact
between the
men and women stationed in Iraq. Another journalist who has
reported
on the Mojahedin described similar conduct. "Members living in
the
West are sometimes said to reside in communal houses, permitted little
money of their own and kept on tightly controlled schedules. At Ashraf
camp (in Iraq), one official identified himself as a "political
officer" responsible for training "the cadres."
Another glimpse of Mojahedin
conduct can be gleaned from a review of their speech. The
language
used by Mojahedin members among themselves, in contrast with the
dialogue they conduct with Westerners, is often hierarchical and
apocalyptic. Excerpts of broadcasts of the clandestine "Voice of
Mojahed" are representative of MKO style: "Sister Maryam Rajavi
...
has called on all our compatriots ... to raise the cry of protest....
(Protest by) setting fire to the centers of oppression, (and) pillaging
and plundering the regime."
Other "Voice of Mojahed" broadcasts
describe those MKO members who are killed as martyrs who have "joined
the caravan of eternal splendor." In contrast, the
Mojahedin have
described all Iranian government officials as "mercenaries of the
regime, doomed to annihilation." They have further
noted that all
"who resist the tyranny-destroying conflagration of the National
Liberation Army are warned that the flaming storm of the people's fury
will not rest until it has wiped out the last foundation stones of the
structure of the tyranny and repression of Khomeini: The flames
that
flicker from the weapons of the lionhearted combatants of the NLA
manifest the fiery wrath of God. Woe to those who cross its path."
Back to Top
IV: EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Saddam Hussein has been one of the
organization's primary financiers, providing weapons and, cash totaling
an estimated hundreds of millions of dollars. Mojahedin offices in
Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Australia are responsible
for collecting donations from private citizens --especially Iranian
expatriates -- for the MKO. The Mojahedin claim that Iranian
bazaari
merchants have provided contributions to their organization. The
Mojahedin also are alleged to have assigned members full-time to the
task of earning money for use by the organization. An Italian
reporter
recently claimed the MKO's financial support was derived from
international business: "The opposition has established a very
flourishing network of international companies trading in carpets,
gold, and automobiles." Details about the identities
and amounts of
the MKO's sources of financial support are not available in open source
reporting.
ENDNOTES
ANNEX 2: LIST OF EXPERTS