By
Kenneth R.
Timmerman
FrontPageMagazine.com |
December 15, 2006
Much ink has already been
spilled on the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group report. Welcomed by
liberals and condemned by conservatives, more importantly it has been
rejected
by just every public figure
in Iraq.
Without a doubt, the
report’s most controversial recommendation was the call for
direct talks with the governments of Syria and Iran. What has gone
unrecognized, however, are the stunning misconceptions underlying
that recommendation.
(Note: the page references below all refer to the PDF version of the
report, which can be downloaded
here. All emphasis is
my own).
Misconception #1:
“Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events
within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the
United States should try to engage them constructively.”
(p7)
Neither Iran nor Syria has any interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq. On
the contrary, their behavior shows that chaos and the collapse of the
Iraqi government are in fact their goal. If they had been concerned
with avoiding chaos in Iraq, they had many good opportunities to
support the Iraqi government, to support the building of a national
Iraqi army, and to strengthen border controls. Instead, they promoted
insurgents whose goals were to ignite sectarian conflict.
Misconception #2:
“In seeking to influence the behavior of both
countries, the United States has disincentives and incentives
available.” (p7)
Since the 1979 revolution, the United States has repeatedly attempted
to “influence the behavior” of the regime, without
success. The Baker-Hamilton proposal is a warmed rehash of the same
failed policy we’ve been trying since 1979.
Following the seizure of US hostages in Tehran in 1979, the U.S. and
its allies imposed sweeping diplomatic, economic, and political
sanctions. Tens of billions of dollars of Iranian assets were frozen
around the world. The new Iranian regime became an instant outcast.
Oil output plummeted to one third the pre-revolutionary levels.
Unemployment soared. Per capita income collapsed - and has still not
regained pre-revolutionary levels.
Despite these “disincentives,” the regime persisted in
the behavior we found objectionable.
One could draw similar examples from the 1980s, the 1990s, or the
past few years. Again and again, the world community has sought to “influence
the behavior” of the Tehran regime, and the regime has brushed
off threats and incentives alike. On the contrary, this is a regime
that has been willing to pay a tremendously high price in blood and
treasure to pursue its murderous policies.
Recall that the only reason the regime ultimately released the U.S.
hostages in January 1981 was out of fear that the incoming Reagan
administration would join forces with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and
bring about the collapse of the regime.
Short of an all-out U.S. military assault on Iran, U.S. support for
regime-change is the only approach that can avoid a future Persian
Gulf region dominated by a radical Iranian regime armed with nuclear
weapons. Saying pretty-please, as the Baker-Hamilton group proposed,
just isn’t going to work.
Misconception #3:
“Several Iraqi, U.S., and international officials commented
to us that Iraqi opposition to the United States— and support
for Sadr—spiked in the aftermath of Israel’s bombing
campaign in Lebanon. “ (p24)
This is pure mendacity, and is transparently false. It was the Feb.
2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra (possibly carried out on
orders from Iran) that ignited all-out sectarian conflict, not an
Iranian proxy war hundreds of miles from Iraq’s borders.
Misconception #4: “Iraq
cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major
regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it
simply, all key issues in the Middle East—the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms,
and extremism and terrorism—are inextricably linked.”
This is the type of nonsense the Saudis, their Washington lobbyists
and others have been promoting for some time. Bombs are going off in
Najaf? Hariri gets assassinated in Lebanon? It’s all the fault
of the Jews. If there is logic here, it is not of the sort to make
Americans proud.
Misconception #5:
“&the Support Group should actively engage Iran and
Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions.”
This is a prescription for transforming Iran into the superpower of
the Persian Gulf. It’s no coincidence that following these
encouragements in the Baker-Hamilton report, Iran announced it was
installing 3,000 centrifuges in Natanz. Pay no price, pay no heed (or
as my 13-year son would say, “No pain, no brain.”)
Note that the Saudis and their GCC partners are not the fools that
Baker and Hamilton appear to be. The day after the Iranian nuclear
announcement, the GCC announced that it would be studying a joint “peaceful”
nuclear program, as
I reported earlier this
week.
Misconception #6:
“&[T]he United States and Iran
cooperated in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether
this model can be replicated in the case of Iraq. (Recommendation 9 -
p37)
Recommendation #9 is the core of the Baker-Hamilton argument for
engaging Iran. Here they repeat Misconception #1 (that Iran actually
wants to avoid chaos in Iraq) and Misconception #2 (that the U.S. can
influence Iran’s behavior by offering incentives), to arrive at
Misconception #6, a historic misreading of what actually happened in
Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks on America.
It should be noted that nowhere in the report does the ISG ever
describe how Iran cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan.
In television interviews, Baker has referred to multi-lateral talks
on Afghanistan’s future that included an Iranian government
representative.
But for the Iranians, the Afghan talks were a no-brainer. Once the
United States had smashed the Taliban regime and demonstrated its
dominance in Afghanistan, of course the Iranians wanted to
have a stake in crafting Afghanistan’s future. No one else was
going to protect the Hazara community (Afghanistan’s Shiite
population). Iran felt a historic responsibility to step up to the
plate.
It’s a safe bet that the Islamic regime in Tehran will take
part in international groupings that include U.S. representatives if
they believe that is the only way of meeting their interests. But
this is simply not the case in Iraq.
Beyond that, however, is an omission of tremendous significance. Far
from opposing al Qaeda in Afghanistan, as the Baker-Hamilton report
suggests, the Iranian regime provided material and logistical support
to al Qaeda before 9/11, and opened
a rat line to evacuate top al Qaeda operatives
to Iran in the weeks
after the U.S. assault on Afghanistan began, as the 9/11 commission
report reported.
Even today, Iran harbors several hundred top al Qaeda terrorists,
including Osama Bin Laden’s eldest son Saad and al Qaeda
military leader Saef al-Adel, whom they claim to be holding under “house
arrest.”
Misconception #7:
“&Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame
sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for Iranian
national security interests.” (p37)
Iran’s leaders don’t fear “sectarian tensions,”
they have been stoking them. And should Saudi Arabia or others start
to provide support for Azeri, Baluchi, or other separatists groups
inside Iran, don’t worry: the Rev. Guards will crack down in a
hurry, and Amnesty International won’t be invited to the
party.
Like several other “incentives” listed by the
Baker-Hamilton group, this is a straw man. (Other “incentives”
they cite include things the Iranians know we will do anyway, such “preventing
the Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan.”) The Iranians
certainly aren’t going to change their behavior to get what’s
being given to them for free.
Misconception #8: “Further,
Iran’s refusal to cooperate [with the Support Group]
would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States
in the broader dialogue it seeks (p38)
This statement combines two separate misconceptions: first, that Iran
actually seeks a broader dialogue with the United States (it does
not: it merely seeks an end to perceived U.S. support for regime
change), and second, that the United States might actually hold Iran
accountable if it refuses to adhere to U.S. conditions for our
cooperation.
The record of U.S. negotiations with Iran has been crystal clear: the
minute the United States begins making concessions to Iran, we are
already have way down the slippery slope to capitulation. For proof,
re-read
my cautious welcome in these pages to
Condoleeza Rice’s offer of a straight-up, black-and-white offer
to Iran in May to give up its nuclear program. Anyone who thinks for
an instant the Iranians aren’t aware of our dismal negotiation
record has never tried to buy a Persian carpet.
Glimmers of truth occasionally make it through the smokescreen of
this absolutely abysmal report. “Proposed talks
between Iran and the United States about the situation in Iraq have
not taken place. One Iraqi official told us: ‘Iran is
negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad.’”
(p25)
Given that no one is making the Iranians pay a price for “negotiating”
with the United States by setting off shaped-charge IEDs that murder
Iraqis and U.S. troops, why should they sit with us and agree to make
concessions?
If the Baker-Hamilton report had been written by high school freshmen
who had never left the American suburbs, one would give them a pat on
the back and suggest that they will change their tune once they
encounter the real world, where America’s enemies are numerous,
determined, and deadly.
But Baker and Hamilton don’t have that excuse. Their report,
which offers little more than U.S. capitulation, is based on lies and
misconceptions these veteran practitioners of U.S. foreign policy are
smart enough to understand.
The President should respond to it just as Baker demanded when he
told Congress not to consider it “like a fruit salad and say,
'I like this, but I don’t like that. I like this, but I don’t
like that.'” He should send the report back to its authors with
a Donald Trump cover note: “You’re fired!”
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