News from


 June 23, 2009

Report on alleged coup plot

orchestrated by Mojtaba Khamenei and Ahmadinejad

Persian language original

English Translation

[Note: This translation was provided by a Friend of FDI. If you see important news items in Persian that have not appeared in English, please send them to us for use/]

Events of 12-13 June Coup d'etat code-named: "Sharayet-e Khakestari" (Condition Grey):

On evening of 22 Khordad 1388 (12 June 2009), the Ministry of Interior based on the final and definitive estimates of the results of the votes received from the election ballots from nationwide voting centres, officially awarded Mir-Hossein Mousavi the election win and first and foremost directly advised Ali Khamenei.  Ali Khamenei accepted Mousavi's victory but with the precondition that Mousavi does not rush for the announcement of his win so as to avoid causing any tensions within the government and his supporters.

At the dawn of 23 Khordad 1388 (13 June 2009) a few hours after the Ministry of Interior had advised Khamenei of Mousavi's win, immediately after morning prayers, based on a plan - blue printed well in advance by IRGC, Khamenei was taken from "Beit-e Rahbari (HQ of Supreme Leader)" in Pasteur Square, Tehran and transferred to a predetermined location in North of Tehran, in Aghdassieh.

While in transit to North of Tehran, the IRGC command unit deployed at the HQ's of the Supreme Leader advised Khamenei through Mojtaba Khamenei (his son) that the reason for this transfer was because of a "Condition Grey" and the transfer was as per instructions from the "IRGC Motahari Central Command" unit.    During the transit, the special force battalions 1, 2 and 3 along with the protection team of Khamenei's family and the Physical Protection Team in addition to the Check-and-Neutralize Team were completely transferred from the HQ's of the Supreme Leader to the destination North of Tehran where Khamenei was headed.

On completion of the transfer of Khamenei, the expansion of the coup d’état operations (which had started the previous day in very preliminary form) was actioned throughout the city under code name "Maneuvre Eghtedar (Authority Maneuver)".  Simultaneously with this surprise maneuver which began to uncover its true nature as being a coup d’état, military and special forces - coup d’état units deployed and disperssed throughout the city.
Although20forces behind the coup d’état code named "Maneuver Authority" all were issued and equipped with black police uniform and on the surface giving the maneuver tone and image of being run by the police but the leadership and command was led by a "Council" which consisted of senior IRGC commanders and the head of the police force, "Ahmadi-Moghaddam". The majority of the commanders implementing the maneuver were also commanders of the Revolutionary Guards and were not police commanders. "Mojtaba" second son of Ali Khamenei who represented the Supreme Leader's Office was in direct contact with the Council for the coordination and implementation of the coup. The Council having predicted resistance by Mir-Hossein Mousavi and his camp had prepared in advance an initial (work in progress) arrest list which was completed at later stages of the coup.

It is not clear at this juncture if on 13 June 2009, during the implementation of the coup in Tehran if in fact Khamenei was completely unware of the advanced plan for the coup d'etat and just then only provided with updates and progress reports with regard to the status of the coup implementation in Tehran but was crystal clear is that Khamenei through his son Mojtaba was at the time in direct contact with those in charge of the coup and that he became a supporter of the coup movement after he was briefed earlier in the day.  What is become increasingly clear is the whole planning for the coup had been a premeditated plan by Mojtaba but that Mojtaba for public consumption purposes (and what would possibly become useful at a later stage as damage control measures) deceived to appear and remain arms-length by avoiding to have been on record having given the initial instruction to plan or initiate the coup and falsely give the impression that he/Mojtaba had only entered the scene and became aware of the coup at a later stage and only after the coup had become a foregone conclusion by IRGC and that he/Mojtaba only became a supporter of the coup from this point onwards.

Kenneth R. Timmerman is Executive Director of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran.